Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 7997;andrew.cmu.edu;Ted Anderson Received: from beak.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail for +dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl@andrew.cmu.edu (->+dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl) (->ota+space.digests) ID ; Sat, 31 Mar 90 01:44:28 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <0a556mS00VcJA1qk51@andrew.cmu.edu> Reply-To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU From: space-request+@Andrew.CMU.EDU To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU Date: Sat, 31 Mar 90 01:44:03 -0500 (EST) Subject: SPACE Digest V11 #203 SPACE Digest Volume 11 : Issue 203 Today's Topics: Re: Will we lose another orbiter? Re: Launcher Development Costs Re: Did SEASAT See More Than It Was Supposed To? Re: Need some Space Station Figures ... Re: B-52/Pegasus launch scheduled for April 4 (Forwarded) Re: Supercapacitors?? (was Re: The Amazing technicolour flying coilgun Re: Will we lose another orbiter? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 30 Mar 90 15:01:31 GMT From: pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!nic.MR.NET!timbuk!lfa@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu (Lou Adornato) Subject: Re: Will we lose another orbiter? In article <1990Mar28.160728.14260@cs.rochester.edu>, dietz@cs.rochester.edu (Paul Dietz) writes: >In article <6927@timbuk.cray.com> lfa@timbuk.cray.com (Lou Adornato) writes: >> One of the root causes of the Challenger accident, >> was public pressure to launch on schedule. This was caused by the >> public's inability to understand just how complex and demanding >> launching an experimental aircraft can be. Once people stop taking >> technology for granted, they start learning. Maybe in the long run >> Challenger will have made us stronger by making us see the danger in >> having 90% of our population (and 100% of our policy makers) >> technologically illiterate. >What a load of crap. And a fine good day to you, too. Looks like someone skipped his high fiber breakfast this morning. > >The public isn't responsible for the institutionalized self deception >that characterized pre-Challenger NASA. The public didn't say NASA >would launch 60 (then 24) shuttle flights per year. The public didn't >force NASA to not admit those estimates were baloney. The public >didn't hold a gun to NASA's collective head and say "my god, NASA, >when do you want to launch, next April?" Throughout my lifetime, we Americans have had a growing tendency to leave the "details" of the technology on which we depend to "experts", and then turn on the "eggheads" when anything goes wrong. A case in point is the present attitude about the original launch rate. It seems that the clarity of our hindsight is now considered proof that NASA was actively lying. Anything so obvious after the fact must have been equally obvious to NASA before the fact. Niavete is not to be considered; success or duplicity are the only allowed alternatives. This is the type of public behavior that I was alluding to. The launch rate had little to do with the Challenger disaster. A slip of a few days wouldn't have had that big an impact on the annual launch rate that NASA was pushing at that time. The direct cause of the accident was a mindset by a handful of Huntsville managers that put the Thiokol engineers in the position of having to _prove_ that it was unsafe to launch. I'm not going to be cast as apologist for these idiots. As far as I'm concerned, they should have been liable to criminal prosecution. But the real source of the "must do" mindset was a desperate desire to stay off the critical path, fueled by the public belief (which goes all the way back to the 60's) that launch delays are caused either by bumbling or fraud. This belief is caused entirely by technological ignorance; if you have a black box model of technology, it's hard to understand why NASA takes so much longer to launch than Luke Sywalker. > >It was NASA's responsibility to inform the public about the safe >flight rate of the system, not recklessly exceed it in a futile >attempt to preserve the myth of the shuttle's economic viability. It >was NASA's responsibility to be honest about the potential >capabilities of the shuttle when it was being sold. We _are_ talking about the same public that thought that Gallileo was going to make Florida uninhabitanble for the next 10,000 years, right? The same public that beleived that Meryl Streep knew anything about Alar, aside from the spelling? The same public that _still_ beleives that SDI will make the world safe from "nuculur" war? One of the perks of the engineering biz is that you get to deal mostly with intelligent, educated people. The drawback is that you forget that the average IQ is, by definition, 50. Dealing with overblown expectations isn't as easy as you make it sound. NASA is currently in the process of trying to downscale the public expectations of the space station. Look at all of the NASA-bashing that's been going on in this newsgroup over that. I think it's pretty clear that NASA is in a no win situation, and has been since long before the accident. How do you go about informing the public about safe rates of flight when the public only understands "safe" and "dangerous"? NASA certainly contributed to the unrealistic expectations of the electorate, but it's pretty hard to explain the difference between "operational" and "experimental" to a public that gets it's science education in 30 second sound bytes on the evening news. Just as an aside, how much funding do you think NASA would have gotten for a safety redesign of the already unpopular shuttle if it had grounded the entire fleet in '86 _before_ the accident? > But, as Keyworth >noted, NASA is the only government agency that outright lies. What makes you think the same thing wouldn't have happened to a private contractor? Anyone who's worked outside academia knows that deadlines breed stupidity in any organization. In the ten years that I've been in private industry I've seen engineers intentionally supress information to throw others onto the critical path, and managers fudge status reports to avoid using built-in schedule slippage (just in case my boss is reading this, none of this was at Cray). IMHO, the biggest difference between government and industry is that the civil service types have to spend a dime to justify every penny they spend, and every yutz with ears has the right to an opinion about it. Fact is that NASA has a better launch record than Amroc. I personally hope that this changes, but until private ventures are proven to be a better approach, I wouldn't be in such a rush to shut NASA down. Lou Adornato | Statements herein do not represent the opinions or Cray Research | attitudes of Cray Research, Inc. or its subsidiaries. lfa@cray.com | (...yet) P.S. I'm not from Texas and anyone's inability to post a response has _nothing_ to do with me. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 30 Mar 90 13:11:24 CST From: mccall@skvax1.csc.ti.com Subject: Re: Launcher Development Costs > Jim Bowery, posted by agate!usenet@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (William Baxter) > I agree with Fred McCall on this issue except I'm sure he won't > like the WAY I agree with him. :-) Now *there* is a fairly safe bet! ;-) > Under no circumstances should we find our Congressmen debating with > NASA managers about the details of budget, schedule and the > perversities of technical developments. Right. > Congress is not competent to manage or oversee technically complex > projects and therefore should not attempt to do so. Right again. The trick is to convince *them* of that. And the same reasoning can be applied to most other things Congress 'funds'. Are they really competent to decide what the best uses of funds to take care of the poor are, or what the best use of funds to defend the country is? I really don't think so. > It should, instead, prioritize RESULTS and associate funds with > those RESULTS. Unfortunately, Congress in general isn't even competent to get down to this level of detail. Congress is competent to make decisions on general policy directions, and that's about it. By 'general policy decisions', I mean things like 'establish a manned base on Mars' or whatever. Trying to go from that kind of broad policy brush to funding things in detail winds up putting us right back where we are now, with Congress having to micromanage just what the priorities on every little thing are (which they aren't competent to do) and a huge bureaucracy to decide just what counts as 'partial success' on any given thing. > All funding should be COD, to WHOEVER DELIVERS FIRST. For some things that approach makes sense; for some it does not. Some things are 'time critical', and it's just not feasible to wait for someone to decide to go for a particular 'prize' in those cases. [Examples of those kinds of things are information on landing sites for probes or for initial manned missions - the information is a roadblock to planning the rest of the mission, and it impacts things badly to have to wait until someone in the private sector decides to take whatever risks are necessary to get it.] In my opinion, what Congress *should* be doing is providing approval of that kind of broad policy direction I mentioned earlier, and appropriating funds toward the goals of that policy. How the funding gets spent in detail are decisions that ought to be getting made elsewhere. That would eliminate the 'bookshelf budget' phenomenon, where the printout of the budget takes up some ridiculous amount of shelfspace. Of course, it would also eliminate the ability of Congress to attach riders to various bits and pieces of appropriations bills (which in my opinion would be another plus), so it will never happen. > This is a more general version of a proposal I've been circulating > around Congressional staffers on a "National Science Trust" which > would pay out for delivery of quantifiable information, such as > digital maps at various frequencies, etc. of various bodies and > atmospheres. Was this also posted here? I think I recall reading it (and was almost moved to comment on it then - I can imagine what your response to any criticism of *that* would have been). As I recall it, some parts of it made good sense, some parts of it didn't, and some parts seemed to be motivated solely by politics and ideology and probably shouldn't have been addressed in the first place. > What do NASA's space centers do? Who cares? Maybe sell them off > to the highest bidder and/or let them go belly up, hopefully as soon > as possible. Personally, I think that the thing to do with much of the NASA space system is to get it into the mode that the aeronautical side has been in since its inception. It should be providing the detailed policy direction and technology driving part of the equation. This means that it should be doing the things that are often the first to be cut when the budget axe starts flailing about in Congres, such as Project Pathfinder. Spin the 'space science' part of the organization off to someone like NSF, and let 'space science' compete with all other science for funding (but keep the money from it in the NASA budget and allocate new funds to NSF). This would probably result in *less* funding for space science, given the costs of putting something in space compared to other experimentation, but it would at least put the programs of various scientists into some kind of real competition, and might lead to more funding for *other* science coming out of the space science budget. [Something needs to be done about the bureaucratization that NSF has suffered from down through the years, too, but that's another story.] Anyway, this is more than long enough without getting into too many specifics at this point. ============================================================================== | Fred McCall (mccall@skvax1.ti.com) | My boss doesn't agree with anything | | Military Computer Systems | I say, so I don't think the company | | Defense Systems & Electronics Group | does, either. That must mean I'm | | Texas Instruments, Inc. | stuck with any opinions stated here. | ============================================================================== ------------------------------ Date: 30 Mar 90 19:47:17 GMT From: groucho!steve@handies.ucar.edu (Steve Emmerson) Subject: Re: Did SEASAT See More Than It Was Supposed To? In the referenced article, henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: >... Some scientists were >upset about the loss of a satellite that was still returning good data, but >their case was considerably weakened by the fact that nobody had done much >work on analyzing that data for several years -- it was piling up unread. For what it's worth, I'd just like to make two observations: 1) It's my understanding that the scientists who used the data from the satellite were not informed that it was going to be destroyed. 2) Data that currently just piles up can be very useful at a later time (e.g. meteorological data). Yes, the DOD had the right to destroy the satellite. No, the weren't very considerate about it. Steve Emmerson steve@unidata.ucar.edu ...!ncar!unidata!steve ------------------------------ Date: 30 Mar 90 13:44:00 GMT From: eagle!news@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Dave McKissock) Subject: Re: Need some Space Station Figures ... In article <951.26122182@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu>, v071pzp4@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu asks: >I need to know the orbital height and the interior (shirt-sleeve) >volume of each of the following space stations: > > Space Shuttle (cabin) > Mir > Freedom I have before me a preliminary copy of "Space Station Freedom Technical Overview", dated October 1988. This report contains a table comparing Skylab, Mir, & Freedom. The table is as follows: Current Expanded Skylab MIR MIR Freedom Pressurized Volume (cubic feet) 14,513 6,230 14,928 32,140 Total Weight 159,200 101,418 237,000 485,000 (pounds) Permanent Crew 0 2 6 8 (3 temp) The Freedom US Laboratory & Habitation modules are 14 feet in diameter and 44 feet long. Each of the four nodes is also 14 feet in diameter and 17 feet long. The Japanese Experiment Module is 35 feet long & 13 feet in diameter. The European Attached Pressurized Module is 41 feet long and 13 feet in diameter. If you multiply all of these numbers, you get 34,101.99 cubic feet. I have no idea how/why this number was adjusted to get the 32,140 value stated above. If by "orbital height" you mean altitude, Freedom will fly between 180 and 240 nautical miles. Concerning the Industrial Space Facility, on a vugraph I saw the statement "Nonetheless, ISF capabilities are limited. Its power, pressurized volume, and productive crew time are not substantial." How's that for a firm estimate???!!! ------------------------------ Date: 30 Mar 90 16:58:11 GMT From: clyde.concordia.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utgpu!utzoo!henry@uunet.uu.net (Henry Spencer) Subject: Re: B-52/Pegasus launch scheduled for April 4 (Forwarded) In article <411@argosy.UUCP> kevin@argosy.maspar.com (Kevin S. Van Horn) writes: >> The Pegasus program is sponsored by the Department of >>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency... > >Sponsored in what way? It was my understanding that OSC and Hercules paid >for the entire development out of their own funds. Or do you consider >purchasing launches to be a form of sponsorship? While this is in general a valid protest -- there was no DARPA development funding -- DARPA and NASA have been nice to OSC/Herc in a lot of small ways. Most notably, DARPA paid a full commercial price, complete with a deposit well in advance, for the first flight of a new launcher, and I think they put down deposits on two or three more. Most customers would want to see a few successful tests before paying full price for a flight. -- Apollo @ 8yrs: one small step.| Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology Space station @ 8yrs: .| uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu ------------------------------ Date: 30 Mar 90 14:39:00 GMT From: mcsun!ukc!stc!root44!hrc63!mrcu!paj@uunet.uu.net (Paul Johnson) Subject: Re: Supercapacitors?? (was Re: The Amazing technicolour flying coilgun -- Paul Johnson UUCP: !mcvax!ukc!gec-mrc!paj --------------------------------!-------------------------|------------------- GEC-Marconi Research is not | Telex: 995016 GECRES G | Tel: +44 245 73331 responsible for my opinions. | Inet: paj@uk.co.gec-mrc | Fax: +44 245 75244 ------------------------------ Date: 30 Mar 90 16:55:02 GMT From: clyde.concordia.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utgpu!utzoo!henry@uunet.uu.net (Henry Spencer) Subject: Re: Will we lose another orbiter? In article <497c6050.20b6d@apollo.HP.COM> rehrauer@apollo.HP.COM (Steve Rehrauer) writes: >have we (meaning NASA, I guess) learned how to build a better shuttle? >Has Challenger's replacement "evolved" in any way? Not significantly; the specs basically said "build it the same way you built the earlier ones". There are some things like a braking chute added, but those are things that all the orbiters will get eventually. Rockwell apparently told NASA early on that they could build three new orbiters for the price of Endeavour, if NASA would relax the specs to allow substitution of compatible equipment rather than insisting that the new hardware be identical to the old. (Even now there are problems with subcontractors going out of business and tooling being lost, so building an identical orbiter is unnecessarily costly.) NASA wouldn't go for it. -- Apollo @ 8yrs: one small step.| Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology Space station @ 8yrs: .| uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu ------------------------------ End of SPACE Digest V11 #203 *******************